

*“It is not a bug, just an interesting
unexpected behavior”*

extrapolated from Fenzi *et al.*, 2018

Research Objectives

1. **RQ0.** Review of a broad set of cryptographic primitives
2. **RQ1.** Build new metamorphic testing protocols
3. **RQ2.** Test *Rust Crypto*¹ for bugs

¹<https://github.com/RustCrypto>

Outline


Background

Cryptographic Primitives

Security Requirements

Testing Crypto Requirements

Hash Functions




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Hash Function Security Reqs.


Hash Security Reqs :

1. First preimage resistance
i.e. Cannot retrieve x from $H(x)$
2. Second preimage resistance
i.e. Cannot retrieve x' from $H(x)$ s.t. $H(x') = H(x)$

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM)



Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) (2)



KEM Security Requirements

1. IND-CPA

i.e. Indistinguishability of
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3. IND-qCCA
i.e. Indistinguishability of secrets under Chosen Ciphertext Attack with Quantum Computer

KEM Security Requirements

1. IND-CPA


i.e. Indistinguishability of secrets under Chosen Plaintext Attack

2. IND-CCA


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3. IND-qCCA


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Differential Fuzzing with CDF (2017) (1)



Differential Fuzzing with CDF (2017) (2)



Problem

What if you don't have two different implementations ?

Outline

RQ0. Metamorphic testing

Metamorphic Testing Recipe


Practical Example : Kyber KEM

Experimentation and Results


Metamorphic Testing Recipe

1. **Identify Metamorphic Relations (MRs)**
→ Find properties relating input/output changes
2. **Generate Initial Test Cases**
→ Run the program with initial inputs


Metamorphic Test Gadgets




Metamorphic Test Inputs



Metamorphic Test MR



MRs in a nutshell



Metamorphic Example

Target MR :

Kyber : $\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$

Associated Test :

Input: $r \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^l$

Equality: $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(r)$

Output: Ok:pass

$pk, sk \leftarrow \text{Gen}(r)$

$ss, c \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(pk)$

Metamorphic Example

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Output: Ok:pass

$pk, sk \leftarrow \text{Gen}(r)$

$ss, c \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(pk)$

for $i \leq \text{len}(pk)$ **do**

$pk' \leftarrow \text{Maul}(pk)$

$ss', c' \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(pk')$

Bit Contribution Maul()

Skeleton

Input: x

for $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$ **do**

$x' \leftarrow \{0\}^{l-i} \parallel \{1\}^i$

call

end for

Bit Contribution Maul()

Skeleton

```
Input:  $x$   
for  $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \{0\}^{l-i} \parallel \{1\}^i$   
  call  
end for
```

Test Hash Function

```
Input:  $x$   
 $h \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x)$   
for  $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \{0\}^{l-i} \parallel \{1\}^i$   
   $h' \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x')$   
  assert( $h' \neq h$ )  
end for
```

Bit Exclusion Mau1()

Skeleton

Input: x

$l_1 \leftarrow \text{len}(x) \bmod 8$

$l_2 \leftarrow \text{len}(x)$

for $i = l_2 - 1$ **to** l_1 **do**

$x' \leftarrow \{x\}^{l_2} || \{0\}^i$

call

end for

Bit Exclusion Maul()

Skeleton

```
Input:  $x$   
 $l_1 \leftarrow \text{len}(x) \bmod 8$   
 $l_2 \leftarrow \text{len}(x)$   
for  $i = l_2 - 1$  to  $l_1$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \{x\}^{l_2} || \{0\}^i$   
  call  
end for
```

Test Hash Function

```
Input:  $x$   
 $h \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x)$   
for  $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \text{Maul}()$   
   $h' \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x')$   
  assert( $h' \neq h$ )  
end for
```

Note : This is especially useful for C programs

Outline

RQ0. Metamorphic testing

Metamorphic Testing Recipe

Practical Example : Kyber KEM

Experimentation and Results

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Overview of conducted tests (1)

Total : 69 test rounds, 21 primitives tested, 1 *bug* found (twice)

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Crate	MR	Maul()	API	Bugs
PQC_KYBER	$\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$	$\text{gen}(\text{maul}(r))$ $\text{encaps}(pk, \text{maul}(r))$ $\text{encaps}(\text{maul}(pk), r)$ $\text{decaps}(\text{maul}(sk), r)$ $\text{decaps}(sk, \text{maul}(r))$	No Yes Yes Yes Yes	0 0 0 1 0

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PQC_KYBER	$\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$	$\text{gen}(\text{maul}(r))$	No	0
		$\text{encaps}(pk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0
		$\text{encaps}(\text{maul}(pk), r)$	Yes	0
		$\text{decaps}(\text{maul}(sk), r)$	Yes	1
		$\text{decaps}(sk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0
ML-KEM	$\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$	$\text{gen}(\text{maul}(r))$	No	0
		$\text{encaps}(pk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0
		$\text{encaps}(\text{maul}(pk), r)$	Yes	0
		$\text{decaps}(\text{maul}(sk), r)$	Yes	1
		$\text{decaps}(sk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0

Overview of conducted tests (1)

Crate	MR	Maul()	API	Bugs
SHA2	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \neq H(x')$	$H(x) = \text{update}(H(x_1), H(x_2), \dots)$	No	0

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PBKDF2	$\text{PBKDF2}(x) \sim U(0, 2^{160})$	$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA2}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA2}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA3}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
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SHA2 Compression	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
SHA3 Compression	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
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BLAKE2	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^k)$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	Yes	0
BLAKE3	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^k)$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	Yes	0

Outline

RQ1. Experimentation Details

Metamorphic Tests

Statistical Tests

Kyber KEM - Test 2

Test: Encaps(Maul(pk); r)

Format: [(8, EQ), (|pk|, DIFF), (8, EQ)]

GenInput

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("geninput")
2  ( $pk, sk, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Gen(; r)
3   $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || pk || (1^8)_2$ 
4   $aux \leftarrow sk$ 
5  return  $x, Call(), aux$ 
```

Call

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("call")
2  ( $ss, c, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Encaps(&x[1]; r)
3   $y \leftarrow (ss || c, rv)$ 
4  return  $y$ 
```

Test: Decaps(sk, Encaps(Maul(pk); r))

Format: [(8, EQ), (|pk|, DIFF), (8, EQ)]

GenInput

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("geninput")
2  ( $pk, sk, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Gen(; r)
3   $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || pk || (1^8)_2$ 
4   $aux \leftarrow sk$ 
5  return  $x, Call(), aux$ 
```

Call

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("call")
2  ( $ss_e, c$ )  $\leftarrow$  Encaps(&x[1]; r)
3  ( $ss_f, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Decaps( $c, aux$ )
4   $eq \leftarrow \llbracket ss_e = ss_f \rrbracket$ 
5   $y \leftarrow (eq, rv)$ 
6  return  $y$ 
```


2 interpretations ...



Bug

Unexpected interesting behavior

ICS

Kyber KEM - Test 4 (2)




Figure: Kyber KEM secret key layout

Testing SHA-1,2,3

Test: Hash(Maul(x))

Format: [(8, EQ), (ℓ , DIFF), (8, EQ)]

GenInput

- 1 $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || (0^\ell)_2 || (1^8)_2$
- 2 $\text{aux} \leftarrow \perp$
- 3 **return** x , Call(), aux

Call

- 1 $y \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\&x[1])$
- 2 **return** y

Outline

RQ1. Experimentation Details

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Outline

RQ2. Writing a Rust library

Introduction to Rust

Rust Crypto

Our library : metamorphic-testing-rs

Rust

What is Rust ?

- ▶ Compiled programming language
- ▶ Strongly typed
- ▶ Emphasis on memory safety

Outline

RQ2. Writing a Rust library

Introduction to Rust

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Our library : metamorphic-testing-rs

How to test crypto function with Rust ?

A metamorphic test is a set of five functions : GenInput, GenState, Call, Maul, Check

```
 $\sigma \leftarrow \text{GenState}()$   
 $x \leftarrow \text{GenInput}(n)$   
 $y \leftarrow \text{Call}(\sigma, x)$   
for  $i$  in  $1, \dots, \text{runs}$  do  
   $\sigma', x' \leftarrow \text{Maul}(\sigma, x, i)$   
   $y' \leftarrow \text{Call}(\sigma', x')$   
   $\text{Check}(y, y')$   
end for
```

Figure: Fenzi inspired test framework

Applying our framework to SHA in Rust

How to apply our Bit Inclusion test to SHA3 256 ?

```
fn gen_state() -> Sha3_256 {
    return Sha3_256::new();
}

fn gen_input(n: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
    return Rand::randbytes(n).to_vec();
}

fn call(state: Sha3_256, input: Vec<u8>) -> Hash{
    state.update(input);
    return state.finalize();
}

fn maul(state: Sha3_256, input: Vec<u8>, i: usize) -> (Sha3_256, Vec<u8>) {
    let output = input;
    flip_bit_at_index(&mut output, i);
    return (state, output);
}

fn check(ref_output: Vec<u8>, output: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
    return ref_output != output;
}
```


Our library

Rust library² allowing to create and run metamorphic tests

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- ▶ Set of traits (interfaces) to plug cryptographic libraries

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- ▶ Only two lines of code to add a new hash implementation from Rust Crypto
- ▶ Run tests in parallel to improve speed
- ▶ Free and open source

Key Takeways

1. Metamorphic testing is useful when no oracle is available
2. ML-KEM Kyber implementation is not compliant with NIST specificities
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1. Metamorphic testing is useful when no oracle is available
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5. Future works : test more primitives (NTLM ;))

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Thank you !