

*“It is not a bug, just an interesting
unexpected behavior”*

extrapolated from Fenzi *et al.*, 2018

Outline

Research Objectives

Background

Cryptographic Primitives

Security Requirements

Testing Crypto Requirements

RQ0. Metamorphic testing

Metamorphic Testing Recipe

Practical Example : Kyber KEM

Experimentation and Results

RQ1. Experimentation Details

Metamorphic Tests

Statistical Tests

RQ2. Writing a Rust library

Introduction to Rust

Rust Crypto

Our library : metamorphic-testing-rs

Conclusions

Key Takeaways

Research Objectives

1. **RQ0.** Review of a broad set of cryptographic primitives
2. **RQ1.** Build new metamorphic testing protocols
3. **RQ2.** Test *Rust Crypto*¹ for bugs

¹<https://github.com/RustCrypto>

Outline

Background

Cryptographic Primitives

Security Requirements

Testing Crypto Requirements

Cryptographic Primitives Examples

- ▶ Hash Functions (*e.g.*, SHA-256)

Outline

Background

Cryptographic Primitives


Security Requirements

Testing Crypto Requirements

What are security requirements ?

Explicit and **necessary** properties of crypto primitives

Hash Functions



learnmeabitcoin.com

Hash Function Security Reqs.

Hash Security Reqs :

1. First preimage resistance
i.e. Cannot retrieve x from $H(x)$

Hash Function Security Reqs.

Hash Security Reqs :


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i.e. Cannot retrieve x' from $H(x)$ s.t. $H(x') = H(x)$

Hash Function Security Reqs.


Hash Security Reqs :

1. First preimage resistance
i.e. Cannot retrieve x from $H(x)$
2. Second preimage resistance
i.e. Cannot retrieve x' from $H(x)$ s.t. $H(x') = H(x)$
3. Collision resistance
i.e. Cannot retrieve (x, y) s.t. $H(x) = H(y)$

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM)



Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) (2)



KEM Security Requirements

1. IND-CPA

i.e. Indistinguishability of
secrets under Chosen
Plaintext Attack

KEM Security Requirements

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3. IND-qCCA
i.e. Indistinguishability of secrets under Chosen Ciphertext Attack with Quantum Computer

KEM Security Requirements

1. IND-CPA


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Testing security requirements (old way)

Algo. testing using tests vectors

Input: $p \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ // Test vector input

Input: $h_T \leftarrow \text{SHA3}_{REF}(p)$ // Test vector output

Output: Ok:pass

$h_t \leftarrow \text{SHA3}_{TEST}(p)$


$\text{assert}(h_t == h_T)$ // Compare to Ref.

Just *trust* the reference implementation ... or don't ?


Name of the Submission	Bit-Contribution Test	Bit-Exclusion Test	Update Test	Summary
Abacus	passed	failed	passed	failed
ARIRANG	failed	failed	failed	failed
ARIRANG Update	passed	passed	passed	passed
AURORA	passed	passed	passed	passed
BLAKE	failed	passed	failed	failed
BLAKE Round 2	passed	passed	failed	failed
BLAKE Final Round	passed	passed	failed	failed
Blender	failed	passed	failed	failed
Blue Midnight Wish	passed	passed	failed	failed
Blue Midnight Wish Round 2	passed	passed	failed	failed
BOOLE	passed	passed	passed	passed
Cheetah	failed	passed	failed	failed
CHI	passed	passed	passed	passed
CHI Update	passed	passed	passed	passed
CRUNCH	failed	failed	failed	failed
CRUNCH Update	passed	passed	failed	failed

Figure: *Post-mortem* testing of SHA-3 NIST reference implem. [Mou+18]

Differential Fuzzing with CDF (2017) (1)



Differential Fuzzing with CDF (2017) (2)



Problem

What if you don't have two different implementations ?

Outline

RQ0. Metamorphic testing

Metamorphic Testing Recipe

Practical Example : Kyber KEM

Experimentation and Results

Metamorphic Testing Recipe

1. Identify Metamorphic Relations (MRs)

→ Find properties relating input/output changes


Metamorphic Testing Recipe

1. **Identify Metamorphic Relations (MRs)**
→ Find properties relating input/output changes
2. **Generate Initial Test Cases**
→ Run the program with initial inputs


Metamorphic Testing Recipe

- 1. Identify Metamorphic Relations (MRs)**
→ Find properties relating input/output changes
- 2. Generate Initial Test Cases**
→ Run the program with initial inputs
- 3. Maul Input**
→ Modify input based on MRs and generate new test cases.
- 4. Verify Outputs**
→ Ensure modified inputs produce expected results from MR.


Metamorphic Test Gadgets




Metamorphic Test Inputs



Metamorphic Test MR



MRs in a nutshell



Metamorphic Example

Target MR :

Kyber : $\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$

Associated Test :

Input: $r \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^l$

Metamorphic Example

Target MR :

Kyber : $\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$

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Equality: $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(r)$

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$pk, sk \leftarrow \text{Gen}(r)$

$ss, c \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(pk)$

for $i \leq \text{len}(pk)$ **do**

$pk' \leftarrow \text{Maul}(pk)$

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for $i \leq \text{len}(pk)$ **do**

$pk' \leftarrow \text{Maul}(pk)$

$ss', c' \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(pk')$

$\text{assert}((ss', _) \neq (ss, _))$

end for

Examples Maul()

- ▶ **Bit-Contribution**

 - *verify all input bits impact output*

- ▶ **Bit-Exclusion**

 - *verify padding related functions*

- ▶ **Update**

 - *verify SHA3-like compress & update cycles*

Bit Contribution Maul()

Skeleton

Input: x

for $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$ **do**

$x' \leftarrow \{0\}^{l-i} \parallel \{1\}^i$

call

end for

Bit Contribution Maul()

Skeleton

```
Input:  $x$   
for  $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \{0\}^{l-i} \parallel \{1\}^i$   
  call  
end for
```

Test Hash Function

```
Input:  $x$   
 $h \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x)$   
for  $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \{0\}^{l-i} \parallel \{1\}^i$   
   $h' \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x')$   
  assert( $h' \neq h$ )  
end for
```

Bit Exclusion Mau1()

Skeleton

Input: x

$l_1 \leftarrow \text{len}(x) \bmod 8$

$l_2 \leftarrow \text{len}(x)$

for $i = l_2 - 1$ **to** l_1 **do**

$x' \leftarrow \{x\}^{l_2} || \{0\}^i$

 call

end for

Bit Exclusion Maul()

Skeleton

```
Input:  $x$   
 $l_1 \leftarrow \text{len}(x) \bmod 8$   
 $l_2 \leftarrow \text{len}(x)$   
for  $i = l_2 - 1$  to  $l_1$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \{x\}^{l_2} || \{0\}^i$   
  call  
end for
```

Test Hash Function

```
Input:  $x$   
 $h \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x)$   
for  $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \text{Maul}()$   
   $h' \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x')$   
  assert( $h' \neq h$ )  
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Bit Exclusion Maul()

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Input:  $x$   
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  call  
end for
```

Test Hash Function

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Input:  $x$   
 $h \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x)$   
for  $i \leq l = \text{len}(x)$  do  
   $x' \leftarrow \text{Maul}()$   
   $h' \leftarrow \text{SHA256}(x')$   
  assert( $h' \neq h$ )  
end for
```

Note : This is especially useful for C programs

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Metamorphic Testing Recipe

Practical Example : Kyber KEM

Experimentation and Results

Practical Example : Kyber KEM

Input: $r \leftarrow \text{PRNG}()$

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for $i = 0$ **to** $\text{len}(pk)$ **do**

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for $i = 0$ **to** $\text{len}(pk)$ **do**

$pk' \leftarrow \text{Maul}(pk)$

$(ss', c') \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(pk')$

assert $(ss' \neq ss)$

end for

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Experimentation and Results

Overview of conducted tests (1)

Total : 69 test rounds, 21 primitives tested, 1 *bug* found (twice)

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Crate	MR	Maul()	API	Bugs
PQC_KYBER	$\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$	$\text{gen}(\text{maul}(r))$ $\text{encaps}(pk, \text{maul}(r))$ $\text{encaps}(\text{maul}(pk), r)$ $\text{decaps}(\text{maul}(sk), r)$ $\text{decaps}(sk, \text{maul}(r))$	No Yes Yes Yes Yes	0 0 0 1 0

Overview of conducted tests (1)

Total : 69 test rounds, 21 primitives tested, 1 *bug* found (twice)

Crate	MR	Maul()	API	Bugs
PQC_KYBER	$\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$	$\text{gen}(\text{maul}(r))$	No	0
		$\text{encaps}(pk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0
		$\text{encaps}(\text{maul}(pk), r)$	Yes	0
		$\text{decaps}(\text{maul}(sk), r)$	Yes	1
		$\text{decaps}(sk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0
ML-KEM	$\text{encaps}(pk, r) = \text{decaps}(sk, \text{encaps}(pk, r))$	$\text{gen}(\text{maul}(r))$	No	0
		$\text{encaps}(pk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0
		$\text{encaps}(\text{maul}(pk), r)$	Yes	0
		$\text{decaps}(\text{maul}(sk), r)$	Yes	1
		$\text{decaps}(sk, \text{maul}(r))$	Yes	0

Overview of conducted tests (1)

Crate	MR	Maul()	API	Bugs
SHA2	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \neq H(x')$	$H(x) = \text{update}(H(x_1), H(x_2), \dots)$	No	0

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SHA3	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
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SHA3	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \neq H(x')$	$H(x) = \text{update}(H(x_1), H(x_2), \dots)$	No	0
PBKDF2	$\text{PBKDF2}(x) \sim U(0, 2^{160})$	$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA2}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA2}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA3}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA3}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0

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Crate	MR	Maul()	API	Bugs
SHA2	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
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SHA3	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \neq H(x')$	$H(x) = \text{update}(H(x_1), H(x_2), \dots)$	No	0
PBKDF2	$\text{PBKDF2}(x) \sim U(0, 2^{160})$	$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA2}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA2}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA3}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
		$\text{pbkdf2}(\text{SHA3}(\text{maul}(x)))$	No	0
SHA2 Compression	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
SHA3 Compression	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0

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SHA2	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \neq H(x')$	$H(x) = \text{update}(H(x_1), H(x_2), \dots)$	No	0
SHA3	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
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SHA3 Compression	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{256})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^{512})$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	No	0
BLAKE2	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^k)$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	Yes	0
BLAKE3	$H(x) \sim U(0, 2^k)$	$H(\text{maul}(x))$	Yes	0

Outline

RQ1. Experimentation Details

Metamorphic Tests

Statistical Tests

Kyber KEM - Test 2

Test: Encaps(Maul(pk); r)

Format: [(8, EQ), (|pk|, DIFF), (8, EQ)]

GenInput

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("geninput")
2  ( $pk, sk, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Gen(; r)
3   $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || pk || (1^8)_2$ 
4   $aux \leftarrow sk$ 
5  return  $x, Call(), aux$ 
```

Call

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("call")
2  ( $ss, c, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Encaps(&x[1]; r)
3   $y \leftarrow (ss || c, rv)$ 
4  return  $y$ 
```

Test: Decaps(sk, Encaps(Maul(pk); r))

Format: [(8, EQ), (|pk|, DIFF), (8, EQ)]

GenInput

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("geninput")
2  ( $pk, sk, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Gen(; r)
3   $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || pk || (1^8)_2$ 
4   $aux \leftarrow sk$ 
5  return  $x, Call(), aux$ 
```

Call

```
1  ( $\_, r$ )  $\leftarrow$  PRG("call")
2  ( $ss_e, c$ )  $\leftarrow$  Encaps(&x[1]; r)
3  ( $ss_f, rv$ )  $\leftarrow$  Decaps( $c, aux$ )
4   $eq \leftarrow \llbracket ss_e = ss_f \rrbracket$ 
5   $y \leftarrow (eq, rv)$ 
6  return  $y$ 
```

Kyber KEM - Test 3

Test: Decaps(sk, Maul(c))

Format: [(8, EQ), ($|c|$, DIFF), (8, EQ)]

GenInput

- 1 $(s, r) \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\text{"geninput"})$
- 2 $(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(; r)$
- 3 $(-, r') \leftarrow \text{PRG}(s)$
- 4 $(ss_e, c) \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(\text{pk}; r')$
- 5 $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || c || (1^8)_2$
- 6 $\text{aux} \leftarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$
- 7 **return** $x, \text{Call}(), \text{aux}$

Call

- 1 $(ss_f, rv) \leftarrow \text{Decaps}(\text{aux}, \&x[1])$
- 2 $y \leftarrow (ss_f, rv)$
- 3 **return** y

Kyber KEM - Test 4 (1)

Test: $\text{Decaps}(\text{Maul}(\text{sk}), c)$

Format: $[(8, \text{EQ}), (|\text{sk}|, \text{DIFF}), (8, \text{EQ})]$

GenInput

```
1   $(s, r) \leftarrow \text{PRG}(\text{"geninput"})$   
2   $(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\cdot; r)$   
3   $(\cdot, r') \leftarrow \text{PRG}(s)$   
4   $(ss_e, c) \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(\text{pk}; r')$   
5   $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || \text{sk} || (1^8)_2$   
6   $\text{aux} \leftarrow (\text{pk}, c)$   
7  return  $x, \text{Call}(), \text{aux}$ 
```

Call

```
1   $(ss_f, rv) \leftarrow \text{Decaps}(\&x[1], \text{aux})$   
2   $y \leftarrow (ss_f, rv)$   
3  return  $y$ 
```

2 interpretations ...



Bug

Unexpected
interesting
behavior

ICS

Kyber KEM - Test 4 (2)




Figure: Kyber KEM secret key layout

Testing SHA-1,2,3

Test: Hash(Maul(x))

Format: [(8, EQ), (ℓ , DIFF), (8, EQ)]

GenInput

- 1 $x \leftarrow (1^8)_2 || (0^\ell)_2 || (1^8)_2$
- 2 $\text{aux} \leftarrow \perp$
- 3 **return** x , Call(), aux

Call

- 1 $y \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\&x[1])$
- 2 **return** y

Outline

RQ1. Experimentation Details

Metamorphic Tests

Statistical Tests

statistical tests



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- ▶ They ensure bit distribution "looks like random"

statistical tests



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- ▶ They ensure bit distribution “looks like random”
- ▶ It’s like ensuring that a dice isn’t loaded by throwing it multiple times
- ▶ We used TestU01 test suite on outputs from different HMAC and hash compression algorithms

Outline

RQ2. Writing a Rust library

Introduction to Rust

Rust Crypto

Our library : metamorphic-testing-rs

Rust

What is Rust ?

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What is Rust ?

- ▶ Compiled programming language
- ▶ Strongly typed
- ▶ Emphasis on memory safety
- ▶ Try to avoid runtime errors
- ▶ Many critical use-cases (Network stack, Kernel, ...)

Outline

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Rust crypto

Project which aims to centralize and maintain many cryptographic implementations in Rust

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Project which aims to centralize and maintain many cryptographic implementations in Rust

- ▶ Gather many cryptographic primitives
- ▶ Standard shared APIs to use families of primitives
- ▶ Good documentation (known attacks, recommended key sizes and primitives, ...)

Biggest cryptographic library but others do exist (Ring...)

How to test crypto function with Rust ?

```
use sha3::{Digest, Sha3_256};  
  
let mut hasher = Sha3_256::new();  
hasher.update(b"abc");  
let hash = hasher.finalize();
```

Figure: Rust code to use SHA3 256

How to test crypto function with Rust ?

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A metamorphic test is a set of five functions : GenInput, GenState, Call, Maul, Check

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A metamorphic test is a set of five functions : GenInput, GenState, Call, Maul, Check

```
 $\sigma \leftarrow \text{GenState}()$   
 $x \leftarrow \text{GenInput}(n)$   
 $y \leftarrow \text{Call}(\sigma, x)$   
for  $i$  in  $1, \dots, \text{runs}$  do  
   $\sigma', x' \leftarrow \text{Maul}(\sigma, x, i)$   
   $y' \leftarrow \text{Call}(\sigma', x')$   
   $\text{Check}(y, y')$   
end for
```

Figure: Fenzi inspired test framework

Applying our framework to SHA in Rust

How to apply our Bit Inclusion test to SHA3 256 ?

Applying our framework to SHA in Rust

How to apply our Bit Inclusion test to SHA3 256 ?

```
fn gen_state() -> Sha3_256 {  
    return Sha3_256::new();  
}  
  
fn gen_input(n: usize) -> Vec<u8> {  
    return Rand::randbytes(n).to_vec();  
}  
  
fn call(state: Sha3_256, input: Vec<u8>) -> Hash{  
    state.update(input);  
    return state.finalize();  
}  
  
fn maul(state: Sha3_256, input: Vec<u8>, i: usize) -> (Sha3_256, Vec<u8>) {  
    let output = input;  
    flip_bit_at_index(&mut output, i);  
    return (state, output);  
}  
  
fn check(ref_output: Vec<u8>, output: Vec<u8>) -> bool {  
    return ref_output != output;  
}
```

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Our library : `metamorphic-testing-rs`

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Rust library² allowing to create and run metamorphic tests

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- ▶ Free and open source

Outline

Conclusions

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Thank you !