
REDOCS Machine learning for IDS log analysis

Joseph Azar (FEMTO-ST) Malcolm Bourdon (EDF R&D, LAAS-CNRS) Alexandre Debant (Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA) Julien Girard-Satabin (CEA, INRIA) Yuxiao Mao (LAAS-CNRS)


October 25, 2019



IEC 104 protocol



IEC 104 protocol



	10	-	🔏 capture104v2.		
104asd					Equestion.
2.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
		A241 4001 414	ADE14001414	10100 2000	No + 1413-11
	6.141748	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (18,4)
	6.268741	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (4,17)
	6.296668	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (19,5)
	6.344411	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (28,5)
	6.391731	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (21,5)
	6.679825	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (5,22)
	6.734431	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (22,6)
	6.781343	192.168.1.2	192,168,1,1	104asdu	82 -> I (23,6)
	7.092406	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (6,24)
	7.132134	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (24,7)
	7.172189	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (25,7)
	7.219472	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (26,7)
	7.388514	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (7,27)
	7.344424	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (27,8)
	7.578546	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (8,28)
	7.689554	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (28,9)
	7.781595	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	114 <- I (9,29)
	7.812594	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (29,10)
	7.859582	192.168.1.2	192,168,1,1	104asdu	82 -> I (38,11)
	7.986578	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (31,12)
	7.954621	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	84 -> I (32,12)
	8.000147	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (33,12)
	8.847596	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (34,12)
184	8.812613	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	114 <- I (12,35)
	8.844695	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (35,13)
107	8.898739	192.168.1.2	192,168,1,1	104asdu	82 -> I (36,14)
	8.944544	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (37,15)
	8.984712	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	84 -> I (38,15)
	9.031753	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (39,15)
	9.078237	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (48,15)
117	9.779602	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (15,35)
	9.828935	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (41,16)
	9.876173	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (42,16)
124	9.927401	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (43,16)
128	10.862884	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	10-lasdu	82 <- I (16,44) nor

▶ Frame 53: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_a5:39:77 (#8:80:27:a5:39:77), Dst: PcsCompu_94:1e:3d (#8:80:27:94:1e:3d)

▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.2, Dst: 192.168.1.1


▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 2484, Dst Port: 47988, Seq: 289, Ack: 89, Len: 16

▶ IEC 60878-5-104-Apci: -> I (17,4)

▼ IEC 60878-5-104-Asdu: ASDU=1 C SC NA 1 ActTern IOA=1 'single command'

	TypeId: C_SC_NA_1 (45)
	0 = SQ: False
	.000 0001 = NumIx: 1
	00 1010 = CauseTx: ActTerm (10)
	.0 = Negative: False
	0 = Test: False
	0A: 1
	Addr: 1
4	T04: 1
	IOA: 1
	₩ SC0: 8x88
	.000 00 = OU: No pulse defined (0)
	0 = S/E: Execute
	offit fift = 5) ET Excente

IEC 104 protocol - attacks



	•			capture104v2.	рсар	
6		0	S X 🗆 🔲	Q 🛶 🛶 🥯	X & 	🗏 Q Q Q 🞹
-		<u>n</u> e		=	· · · · · · · · · · · ·	
10	4asdu					Expression •
λ.		Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
		0.024302	101.100.111		1040300	04 - 1 117 - 1
		6.141748	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (18,4)
		6.268741	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (4,17)
		6.296668	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (19,5)
		6.344411	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (20,5)
		6.391731	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (21,5)
_		6.679825	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (5,22)
_		6.734431	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (22.6)
			192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu 104asdu	82 -> I (23,6)
		7.092405	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1		82 <- I (6,24)
		7.132134	192.168.1.2		104asdu	82 -> I (24,7)
		7.172189	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (25,7)
		7.219472	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (26,7)
		7.388514	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (7,27)
		7.344424	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (27,8)
		7.578546	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (8,28)
		7.689554	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (28,9)
		7.781595	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	114 <- I (9,29)
		7.812594	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (29,10)
		7.859582	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (38,11)
		7.986578	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (31,12)
		7.954621	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	84 -> I (32,12)
_		8.000147	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (33,12)
		8.847595	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (34,12)
		8.812613	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	114 <- I (12,35)
		8.844695	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (35,13)
		8.898739	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (36,14)
		8.944544	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (37,15)
		8.984712	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	84 -> I (38,15)
		9.031753	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (39,15)
		9.078237	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (40,15)
		9.779682	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (15,35)
		9.828935	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (41,16)
		9.876173	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (42,16)
		9.927481	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (43,16)
		18.862884	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (16,44) nov
	100	10 110100	100 100 1 0	102 100 1 2	101	AN - T (44 17) AND

The attacker is able to:

- replay valid packet already sent
- forge and send an invalid packet
- sending arbitrary messages of the protocol
- sending many packets quickly



Problem

How can we detect malicious behaviours using machine learning techniques?

•		capture104v2.	ocap	
10	5 X C =	९ 🗰 👄 🕾	T + D =	0 Q Q T
Lessilu				El Treman, +
Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Lengt Info
of WAWFFLINE	A.F		A ROTH COALS	MA TO A SAFATS
55 6.141748	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (18,4)
57 6.260741	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (4,17)
58 6.295668	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (19,5)
68 6.344411	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (20,5)
62 6.391731	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (21,5)
64 6.679825	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 ≪- I (5,22)
66 6.734431	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 → I (22,6)
68 6.781343	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 → I (23,6)
78 7.092406	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 ≪- I (6,24)
71 7.132134	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 → I (24,7)
73 7.172189	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 → I (25,7)
75 7.219472	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 → I (26,7)
77 7.388514	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (7,27)
80 7.344424	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (27,8)
84 7.578546	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (8,28)
85 7.689554	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (28,9)
89 7.781595	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	114 <- I (9,29)
90 7.812594	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (29,10)
92 7.859582	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (30,11)
94 7.986578	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (31,12)
95 7.954621	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	84 -> I (32,12)
98 8.000147	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (33,12)
100 8.047595	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (34,12)
184 8.812613	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	114 <- I (12,35)
185 8.844695	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (35,13)
187 8.898739	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (36,14)
189 8.944544	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (37,15)
111 8.984712	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	84 -> I (38,15)
113 9.031753	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (39,15)
115 9.078237	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (40,15)
117 9.779682	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (15,35)
120 9.828935	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (41,16)
122 9.876173	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (42,16)
124 9.927401	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	104asdu	82 -> I (43,16)
128 18.852384	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	104asdu	82 <- I (16,44)

ML blitz

Data analysis

ML without sequence

ML with sequences

Conclusion

ML blitz


Why do we use machine learning today?

Drowning in a sea of information



about 10^6 terabytes per day

Hard to specify sometimes



No specification of what is a pedestrian: learn from examples


 $ilde{f}$: ideal function $ilde{\mathcal{X}}$: ideal representation of data

Goal

learn f approximating \tilde{f} , using an approximation of data \mathcal{X}


Dataset \mathcal{X} is labelled

Approximated function: classifier between the different labels



Dataset \mathcal{X} is labelled

Approximated function: classifier between the different labels




Remark: labelling data is costly!

Algorithm	Explainability	Generalization	Learning cost
Decision Tree (DT)	very good	poor	cheap
Support Vector	200	rood	choop
Machine (SVM)	poor	good	cheap
Neural Networks (NN)	poor	very good	expensive

Dataset ${\mathcal X}$ is not labelled

Rely on the inherent structure of the data

Approximated function: a representation of the data



Algorithm	Generalization	Learning cost
Clustering (k-nn)	good	cheap
Dimensionality reduction (PCA, t-SNE)	poor	cheap
Neural networks (auto-encoders)	very good	expensive

Data analysis

Data analysis: first analysis

	8	C	D E	F	G	н	1.1	1	ĸ	L	M	N	0	P	Q	R	5	т	U	v	w	X	Y	Z	
1 addr	attack	capturec cau		t fram	e_loa	Ip_check	s lp_ch			lp_src		ginu	пса	proto_nai	i proto			tcp_size	test		etypeld .	qol	siq	\$60	dco
2 100	0	82 4	47900	82	0	65425	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2		1	0	104asdu			2404		0		70	-1	-4	-1	-1
3 500	0	82 4	47900	82	0	65424	2		20	192.168.1.2			0	104asdu	10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	70	-1	-4	-1	-1
4 1111	0	82 6	2404	82	0	7069	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-4	-1	-1
5 100	0	82 7	47900	82	0	65423	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2			1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-4	-1	-1
5 500	0	82 7	47900	82	0	65422	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2			1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-4	-1	-1
7 100	0	82 20	47900	82	65536	65421	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2		1	1	104andu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09		-1	0	-1	-1
8 500	0	84 20	47900	84	655360	65418	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	12	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	9	-1	-4	-1	-1
500	0	82 20	47900	82	983040	65419	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104andu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	3	-1	-2	-1	-1
0 100	0	90 20	47900	90	131072	65410	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	3	1	104asdu	18	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
1 100	0	82 10	47900	82	0	65417	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-1	-1	-1
2 500	0	82 10	47900	82	0	65416	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-1	-1	-1
3 100	0	82 6	2404	82	65536	7049	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
4 100	0	82 7	47900	82	65536	65413	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
5 100	0	82 10	47900	82	65536	65412	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
6 100	0	82 3	47900	82	65536	65411	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	1	-1	-1
7 100	0	82 6	2404	82	131072	7045	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
8 100	0	82 7	47900	82	131072	65410	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.51+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
9 100	0	82 10	47900	82	131072	65409	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2		1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
0 100	0	82 3	47900	82	131072	65408	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.51+09	1	-1	1	-1	-1
1 100	0	82 6	2404	82	65536	7040	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
2 100	0	82 7	47900	82	65536	65406	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.51+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
3 100	0	82 10	47900	82	65536	65405	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
4 100	0	82 3	47900	82	65536	65404	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.52+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
5 100	0	82 6	2404	82	131072	7035	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-4	0	-1
6 100	0	82 7	47900	82	131072	65403	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.52+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
7 100	0	82 10	47900	82	131072	65402	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-4	0	-1
8 100	0	82 3	47900	82	131072	654001	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5£+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
9 100	1	82 6	2404	82	131072	7031	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-4	0	-1
100	1	82 7	47900	82	131072	65399	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104andu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
1 100	1	82 10	47900	82	131072	65398	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-4	0	-1
2 100	1	82 6	2404	82	131072	7028	2	192,168,1,2		192.168.1.1		1	1	104andu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	4	0	-4
3 100	1	82 7	47900	82	131072	65397	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	4	0	-1
4 100	1	82 10	47900	82	131072	65396	2		20	192.168.1.2		1	1	104andu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	4	0	-4
5 100	0	82 3	47900	82	131072	65395	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1

- data size: 863 row×27 columns, 147 kB
- attack / non attack: 610 / 253

Data analysis: first analysis

	A.	8	C	D	E	F	G	н	1.1	1	ĸ	L.	м	N	0	P	Q	R	5	т	U	v	w	X	Y	z	1.1
1 ad		attack	captures	causetx		frame	loa	Ip_check	s lp_che	ip_dest	Ip_size		neg	nun	n ca	proto_nar	prob	14	src_port	tcp_size	test	timestam	etypeld	qol	siq	\$60	dco
2 10		0	82	4	47900	82	0	65425	2	192.168.1.1	20		0	1	0		10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	70	-1	-1	-1	-1
3 50		0	82	4	47900	82	0	65424	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	70	-1	-2	-1	-1
4 111	1	0	82	6	2404	82	0	7059	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-4	-1	-1
5 10		0	82	7	47900	82	0	65423	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2		1	1		10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-2	-1	-1
5 50	0	0	82	7	47900	82	0	65422	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-4	-1	-1
7 10		0	82	20	47900	82	65536	65421	2		20	192.168.1.2		1	1		10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
8 50	0	0	84	20	47900	84	655360	65418	2		20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	12	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	9	-1	-4	-1	-1
50		0	82	20	47900	82	983040	65419	2		20	192.168.1.2		1	1		10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	3	-1	-1	-1	-1
0 10	0	0	90	20	47900	90	131072	65410	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	3	1	104asdu	18	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
1 10		0	82	10	47900	82	0	65417			20	192.168.1.2		1	1	104asdu	10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-1	-1	-1
2 50	0	0	82	10	47900	82	0	65416	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-1	-1	-1
3 10		0		6	2404	82	65536	7049	2		20	192.168.1.1		1	1		10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
4 10	0	0	82	7	47900	82	65536	65413	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
5 10		0	82	10	47900	82	65536	65412	2		20	192.168.1.2		1	1		10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
6 10	0	0	82	3	47900	82	65536	65411	2		20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	1	-1	-1
7 10		0		6	2404	82	131072	7045	2		20		0	1	1		10		47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
8 10		0	82	7	47900	82	131072	65410	2		20		0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.51+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
9 10		0	82	10	47900	82	131072	65409	2		20		0	1	1		10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
0 10		•	82	3	47900	82	131072	65408	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10		2404	32	0	1.51+09	1	-1	1	-1	-1
1 10		0	82	6	2404	82	65536	7040	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1		10		47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
2 10		0	82	7	47900	82	65536	65406	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10		2404	32	0	1.51+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
3 10		0	82	10	47900	82	65536	65405	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1		10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
4 10		0	82	3	47900	82	65536	65404	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10		2404	32	0	1.51+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
5 10		0	82	6	2404	82	131072	7035	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1		10		47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
6 10		0	82	7	47900	82	131072	65403	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10		2404	32	0	1.51+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
7 10		0	82	10	47900	82	131072	65402	2		20	192.168.1.2		1	1		10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
8 10		0	82	3	47900	82	131072	65-001	2		20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0		10		2404	32	0		1	-1	0	-1	-1
9 10	0	1	82	6	2404	82	131072	7031	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-4	0	-1
0 10		1	82	7	47900	82	131072	65399	2		20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1		10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-2	0	-1
1 10		1	82	10	47900	82	131072	65398	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1		10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-4	0	-1
2 10		1	82	6	2404	82	131072	7028	2		20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1		10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-2	0	-1
3 10		1	82	7	47900	82	131072	65397	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
4 10		1	82	10	47900	82	131072	65396	2		20	192.168.1.2		1	1		10		2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
5 10	0	0	82	3	47900	82	131072	65395	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1

• attack

- captured_length, dst_port, frame_length, ip_checksum, ip_checksum_status, ip_size, ip_dest, ip_src, src_port, tcp_size, timestamp
- addr, causetx, ioa, nega, numix, oa, proto_name, proto_size, sq, typeid, test, qoi, siq, sco, dco

Data analysis: first analysis

	A.	8	C	D	3	F	G	н	1.1	J	ĸ	L	M	N	0	P	Q		5	т	U	v	w	х	Y	z	1.1
1 ad		attack	capture	causetx	dst_port	frame	loa	lp_check	lp_ch	elp_dest	Ip_size	lp_src	ce;	nun	n ca	proto_nar	i proto	pe :	src_port	tcp_size	test	timestam	typeld	qol	siq	\$60	dco
2 10	0	0	82	4	47900	82	0	65425	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	70	-1	-1	-1	-1
3 50		0	82	4	47900	82	0	65424	2		20	192.168.1.2		1	0	104asdu	10		2404	32	0		70	-1	-1	-1	-1
4 1111	t	0	82	6	2404	82	0	7069	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-4	-1	-1
5 10		0	82	7	47900	82	0	65423	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2		1	1	104asdu	10		2404		0		100	20	-4	-1	-1
5 50	0	0	82	7	47900	82	0	65422	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-4	-1	-1
7 10		0	82	20	47900	82	65536	65421	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2		1	1				2404		0	1.5E+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
8 50	0	0	84	20	47900	84	655360	65418	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	12	0	2404	32	0		9	-1	-4	-1	-1
50	0	0	82	20	47900	82	983040	65419	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104andu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	3	-1	-1	-1	-1
0 10	0	0	90	20	47900		131072	65410	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	3	1	104asdu	18	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
1 10	0	0	82	10	47900	82	0	65417	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	100	20	-1	-1	-1
2 50	0	0	82	10	47900	82	0	65416	2	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0		100	20	-1	-1	-1
3 10	0	0	82	6	2404	82	65536	7049	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
4 10	0	0	82	7	47900	82	65536	65413	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
5 10	0	0	82	10	47900	82	65536	65412	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
6 10	0	0	82	3	47900	82	65536	65411	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	-1	1	-1	-1
7 10	0	0	82	6	2404	82	131072	7045	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
8 10	0	0	82	7	47900	82	131072	65410	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
9 10	0	0	82	10	47900	82	131072	65409	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	1	-1
0 10	0	0	82	3	47900	82	131072	65408	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.52+09	1	-1	1	-1	-1
1 10	0	0	82	6	2404	82	65536	7040	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
2 10	0	0	82	7	47900	82	65536	65406	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.52+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
3 10	0	0	82	10	47900	82	65536	65405	2	192.168.1.1	20	192,168,1,2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
4 10	0	0	82	3	47900	82	65536	65404	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.52+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
5 10	0	0	82	6	2404	82	131072	7035	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
6 10	0	0	82	7	47900	82	131072	65403	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.52+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
7 10	0	0	82	10	47900	82	131072	65402	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-4	0	-1
8 10	0	0	82	3	47900	82	131072	65401	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asdu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.52+09	1	-1	0	-1	-1
9 10	0	1	82	6	2404	82	131072	7031	2	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	4	-4	0	-1
0 10	0	1	82	7	47900	82	131072	65399	2	192.168.1.1	20	192,168,1.2	0	1	1	104andu	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
1 10	0	1	82	10	47900	82	131072	65398	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	1	4	0	-1
2 10		1	82	6	2404	82	131072	7028	2	192.168.1.2		192.168.1.1	0	1	1	104andu	10	0	47900	32	0	1.5E+09	45	-1	-1	0	-1
3 10	0	1	82	7	47900	82	131072	65397	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	45	4	4	0	-1
4 10		1	82	10	47900	82	131072	65396	2	192.168.1.1		192,168,1,2		1	1	104andu	10	0	2404	32	0		45	-1	-1	0	-1
5 10	0	0	82	1	47900	82	131072	65395	2	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	104asda	10	0	2404	32	0	1.5E+09	1	1	0	-1	-1

- important fields:
 - typeid (type identification)
 - causetx (cause of transmission)
 - ioa (information object address)
 - ip_checksum (IPs, sequence of transmission)


- normalization
 - why? different range
 - what? numeric fields
 - how? mean = 0, standard deviation = [-1,1]

- normalization
 - why? different range
 - what? numeric fields
 - how? mean = 0, standard deviation = [-1,1]
- one-hot encoding
 - why? strings
 - what? non numeric fields (type, address...) 192.168.1.1 [1, 0]
 - how? e.g., IP address 192.168.1.2 [0, 1]


- normalization
 - why? different range
 - what? numeric fields
 - how? mean = 0, standard deviation = [-1,1]
- one-hot encoding
 - why? strings
 - what? non numeric fields (type, address...)
 - how? e.g., IP address
 192.168.1.1 [1, 0, 0]
 192.168.1.2 [0, 1, 0]
 192.168.1.3 [0, 0, 1]

Data analysis: Principal Component Analysis (PCA)


• dimensionality reduction




- sequential split (75% training)
 - training: 398 normals, 249 attacks
 - evaluation: 212 normals, 4 attacks



- sequential split (75% training)
 - training: 398 normals, 249 attacks
 - evaluation: 212 normals, 4 attacks
- random split (75% training)
 - training: 448 normals, 199 attacks
 - evaluation: 162 normals, 54 attacks






Log analysis

- small dataset with only 863 IEC104 packets
- repetitive legitimate behaviours
- unbalanced attacks behaviours
 - many Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack packets
 - few occurences of each attack
 - 2 fields to draw out 1/4 attacks
 - 1 field with sequence to draw out most of DoS attacks

ML without sequence

Problem statement and limitations



- inputs: one packet for one output
- limitation: no context (DoS attacks indistinguishable)

Dataset
$$\mathcal{X}$$
, classes $\mathcal{Y} = \{y_1, y_2\}$, $\mathbf{x} = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{bmatrix} \in \mathcal{X}$

$$egin{aligned} x_1 > a &
ightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x} \in y_1)? \ x_1 \leq a &
ightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x} \in y_2)? \end{aligned}$$

Dataset
$$\mathcal{X}$$
, classes $\mathcal{Y} = \{y_1, y_2\}$, $\mathbf{x} = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{bmatrix} \in \mathcal{X}$
 $\mathbf{x} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x} \in y_1)$?

$$x_1 > a \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x} \in y_1)!$$


 $x_1 \leq a \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x} \in y_2)?$

V. \

Decision tree answer those questions

Dataset
$$\mathcal{X}$$
, classes $\mathcal{Y} = \{y_1, y_2\}$, $\mathbf{x} = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{bmatrix} \in \mathcal{X}$
$$x_1 > a \to \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x} \in y_1)?$$
$$x_1 \le a \to \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x} \in y_2)?$$

Decision tree answer those questions



- case split on feature using different criterion (Gini, entropy)
- no parameter tuning, easy to train
- sensitive to data variations, can overfit fast

- dataset is small \Rightarrow sensitive to bad data balancing
- mitigation: train multiple models on multiple splits

 $Accuracy = \frac{TP+TN}{TP+TN+FP+FN}:$ number of correct predictions $Recall = \frac{TP}{TP+FN}:$ number of detected anomalies


- training time is less than 2ms on a Intel I7-8850H
- sequential split: recall is 0%
- random split: recall is 94,3%, accuracy: 96,6%

 $Accuracy = \frac{TP+TN}{TP+TN+FP+FN}:$ number of correct predictions $Recall = \frac{TP}{TP+FN}:$ number of detected anomalies


- training time is less than 2ms on a Intel I7-8850H
- sequential split: recall is 0%
- random split: recall is 94,3%, accuracy: 96,6%

Works surprinsingly well. Why?

Our decisions trees are overfitting



The two culprits features



Log analysis October 25, 2019,

Support Vector Machine (SVM)





image source: wikipedia

- multiple kernels used
- accuracy: 79,7%, recall: 26,3%


Dense NN



- fully connected network
- 4 layers and 10⁶ neurons
- recall : 26,3%, accuracy : 90,9%

Supervised learning works because of over-fitting

K-means and PCA




October 25, 2019,

Log analysis


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Goal: learn the probability distribution of the input

Training objective: input **x**, learn a code *s*, an encoder *Q* and a decoder *P* such that \hat{x} is a **good reconstruction**



(Bad) results for VAE



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
- 1. Strong similarity between legitimate and attack packets
- 2. Unsupervised learning cannot separate efficiently

		Supe	ervised		Unsupervised					
	Name	Acc.	Rec.	Time	Name	Acc.	Rec.	Time		
No-seq.	SVM	80%	26%	<1ms	k-means	N/A	N/A	N/A		
	DT	96%	97%	< 1ms	AE	48%	80%	5min		
	DNN	91%	26%	2min	VAE	N/A	N/A	N/A		


ML with sequences

Sequence classification

- order is important and must be respected
- predicting a class label for a given input sequence
- limitation of classical ML and MLP: Unaware of temporal structure




Supervised sequence classification: LSTM



- recurrent connections
- avoid the problems that prevent the training and scaling of other RNN
- memory cells contain weights and gates

IDS using Bidirectional LSTM




- loss:binary cross-entropy, optimizer: Adam
- epoch: 500, batch: 20
- train: 595 (\approx 155 anomalies), test: 256 (\approx 65 anomalies)
- training time: 5min (no GPU)

Evaluation: the beginner's mistake

- fit to training; evaluate on test; report skill: Wrong !
- deep learning models are stochastic
- LSTM's use randomness while being fit on a dataset
- same model may give different predictions

```
scores=list()
for i in repeats:
    train, test = random_split(data)
    model.fit(train.X,train.y)
    predicitons=model.predict(test.X)
    skill=compare(test.y,predictions)
    scores.append(skill)
final_skill=mean(scores)
```

IDS using Bidirectional LSTM: results



accuracy =
$$\frac{TP+TN}{TP+TN+FP+FN}$$

precision = $\frac{TP}{TP+FP}$
recall = $\frac{TP}{TP+FN}$
 $F1 = 2 \times \frac{precision \times recall}{precision+recall}$
Confusion matrix = $\begin{bmatrix} TN & FP \\ FN & TP \end{bmatrix}$
Confusion matrix = $\begin{bmatrix} 183 & 4 \\ 3 & 66 \end{bmatrix}$

- what if you have no labelled data at all?
- binary analysis requires hours of fingerprinting and study per sample
- incident investigation requires huge resources and bureaucratic layers to triage
- infers hidden latent structure from unlabelled training data
- objective: learn from unlabelled data while respecting the temporal order


- data preparation
- build an auto-encoder on the normal (negatively labelled) data
- use it to reconstruct a new sample
- if the reconstruction error is high, we label it as an attack

IDS using unsupervised learning: data preparation

Index	addr	attack	captured_length	causetx	dst_port	frame_length	ios	ip_checksum	ip_dest	ip_size	ip_arc	nega	numix	ca	proto_size	arc_port	tcp_size
535583977	8180		82	4	47968	82		65425	192.168.1.1	28	192.168.1.2	0	1		18	2494	32
	****	•	02	•	41300	92	•	00454	1911007171	200	196-100-11-6	•	1	•	10	2494	ж
536683077	m	0	82	6	2464	82	0	7059	192.168.1.2	28	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	18	47999	32
536683077	0100	0	82	7	47900	82	0	65423	192.168.1.1	28	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2404	32
536683077	0500	0	82	7	47900	82	0	65422	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2404	32
536683977	0100	0	82	20	47900	82	65536	65421	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2404	32
1536683077	0500	0	64	20	47900	64	655360	65418	192.160.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	12	2404	32
	0000	•	- MA	20	41300	ax.	202040	03419	197.109.1.1	10	192.109.1.2	•		•	10	2494	31
1536683077		0	90	20	47900	90	131072	65410	192.168.1.1		192.160.1.2	0	3	1	19	2404	32
1536683877		0	82	10	47900	82	0	65417	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2494	32
1539683977		0	82	10	47900	92	0	65416	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2494	32
1539683981		0	82	6	2605	82	65536	7049	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	10	47900	32
1539683981		0	82	7	47900	82	65536	65413	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2494	32
1539653951	0100	0	82	10	47900	82	65536	65412	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2494	32
1539683981			82	3	47900	82	65536	65411	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	0	10	2494	32
1539683981	0100	8	82	6	2494	82	131072	7845	192-168-1-2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	10	47999	32
1536683081	8188	8	82	7	47968	82	131872	65418	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	18	2494	32
1536683081	8188	8	82	18	47968	82	131872	65469	192.168.1.1	28	192.168.1.2	8	1	1	18	2494	32
1535583081	8188	8	82	3	47968	82	131672	65468	192.168.1.1	28	192.168.1.2	8	1	0	18	2494	32
1535583083	8188		82	6	2464	82	65536	7848	192.168.1.2	28	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	18	47990	32
1535583083	0100	•	82	7	47900	82	65536	65406	192.168.1.1	28	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	18	2454	32
1536683083		•	82	10	47900	82	65536	65485	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2454	32
1536683083		0	82	3	47900	82	65536	65404	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2		1	•	10	2404	32
1536683083		0	82	6	2404	82	131072	7035	192.168.1.2		192.160.1.1		1	1	10	47900	32
1536683083		0	82	7	47900	82	131072	65403	192.160.1.1		192.160.1.2		1	1	10	2404	32
1536683083		0	82	10	47900	82	131072	65402	192.160.1.1		192.160.1.2	0	1	1	10	2404	32
1536683883		0	82	3	47900	82	131072	65401	192.168.1.1		192.168.1.2	0	1	0	10	2404	32
1536683883		1	82	6	2606	92	131072	7031	192.168.1.2		192.168.1.1	0	1	1	10	47900	32
1536683883	0100	1	82	7	47900	92	131072	65399	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2494	32
	0100	1	82	10	47900	82	131072	65398	192.168.1.1	20	192.168.1.2	0	1	1	10	2494	32
539653554	0100	1	82	6	2494	82	131072	7828	192.168.1.2	20	192.168.1.1	0	1	1	10	47900	32

- the input to LSTMs are 3-dimensional arrays
- sliding window of size 6 and step = 1


IDS using unsupervised learning: LSTM auto-encoder




Log analysis


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
- trained on legitimate packets
- tested on legitimate and attack packets
- epoch: 3500,
 batch: 10
- training time: ≈30 min (no GPU)




IDS using unsupervised learning: LSTM auto-encoder results










Reconstruction error for different classes











IDS using unsupervised learning: LSTM auto-encoder results



auto-encoder (no sequence)



LSTM auto-encoder (sequence)

IDS using unsupervised learning: What can be done better on huge data?

- CNN LSTM Autoencoder
- LSTM Dropout (Dropout_U and Dropout_W)
- Gaussian-dropout layer
- SELU activation
- alpha-dropout with SELU activation

Conclusion

- understand the protocol specification and the attacker model
- being able to identify (non-)legitimate packets

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2. Data analysis

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3. Apply ML techniques with single or sequence of packets

- first, the simplest algorithms (SVM, decision trees, k-means)
- then the more complex ones (DNN, LSTM, auto-encoders)

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4. Evaluation of the results

- presentation of results
- explanation of success/failures (e.g., identify over-fitting)

		Supe	ervised		Unsupervised					
	Name	Acc.	Rec.	Time	Name	Acc.	Rec.	Time		
No-seq.	SVM	80%	26%	<1ms	k-means	N/A	N/A	N/A		
	DT	96%	97%	<1ms	AE	48%	80%	5min		
	DNN	91%	26%	2min	VAE	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Seq.	LSTM	94%	89%	5min	LSTM AE	91%	97%	30min		

Results in a nutshell:

- considering sequences is mandatory
- similar results between unsupervised and supervised ML



Few advices for re-using our approach:

- generate an adapted dataset
- consider a more realistic network
- test the simplest algorithms first

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Thank you for your attention