

GDR IASIS – 11/06/2024
AI Friendly Hacker:
when an AI reveals more than
it should...

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THALES

www.thalesgroup.com



Context

CHALLENGE PROPOSED
BY DGA (FRENCH MOD)
STUDY VULNERABILITIES
OF AI



RÉSERVEZ MAINTENANT

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Introduction

> **CAID : French conference about IA for Defence, organised by DGA the 22th and 23th November 2023 (Rennes, France)**

> **Topics**

- ▶ Application of AI for Defence use case
- ▶ Focus about robustness, certification, explicability of embarked AI systems

> **Two tasks for an unique AI privacy challenge!**

- ▶ Membership Inference attack
- ▶ (Un)Forgetting attack
- ▶ Two submissions for each task by months between May and September, with an updated leaderboard after each submission

<https://caid-conference.eu/challenge/>

> **FGVC Dataset – 10 200 aircraft images**

- ▶ 70 different classes
- ▶ Fine Grained Visual Classification of Aircraft, Majiet *al.*, 2013



DC-8



Boeing 737



DC-9



MD-11



Boeing 717



Gulfstream

©James Richard Covington JR / Airliners




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Two investigations about an AI system, called « export model »

> We're facing investigation...

> ...where the main witness  suffers amnesia

> The main witness is collaborative: she doesn't hesitate to provide the investigator




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Two investigations about an AI system, called « export model »

> We're facing investigation...


> ...where the main witness  suffers amnesia

> The main witness is collaborative: she doesn't hesitate to provide the investigator with the information she has



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Investigations expectation




Investigators



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AI Friendly Hacker project

Information disorders




BattleBox
Training

BattleBox
Evade

BattleBox
IP

BattleBox
Privacy



IP/Copyright infringement

Breach of confidentiality

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Tools common for the two investigations

SHADOWS MODELS, THE PRIVILEGED WITNESSES OF BOTH INVESTIGATIONS



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Export model profile

> ID Card :

- ▶ Famous Victim
- ▶ ResNet50

> Mobile:

- ▶ Export
- ▶ Legacy
- ▶ Leak sensitive information




> Genealogy tree

▶ Few information about the training of the export model

- Training Data ?
- Hyperparameter ?

▶ But countless cousins, brothers & sisters

- Potentially sharing genetic material...
- ... Or may be very far away



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
Research of pertinent shadows models, witnesses of export model personality

> Shadows models objective

- ▶ Train to have similar behaviour that the export model


> Perfect knowledge of genetic materiel for the shadow model

- ▶ Training set known
 - Each shadow model has her partition of data
- ▶ Training hyperparameters known
 - Classes
 - Hyperparameters
 - Data augmentation



First Investigation

TASK A: MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACK



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First interrogation of the export model

> Interrogation process

- ▶ Submission with
 - “train” with well classified observation
 - “test” with misclassified observation
- ▶ Does not respect the knowledge of 800 images in train and 800 in test


> Interrogation results

- ▶ Accuracy 56%

> Interrogation conclusion

- ▶ Training set accuracy: 96%
- ▶ Testing set accuracy: 84%
- ▶ **Export model does not generalize very well**

10/39 submissions are worst than this naïve submission



First interrogation with a confrontation with the shadows models

> Interrogation process

- ▶ 101 partitions of shadows models
- ▶ 50 for training attack, one partition always used for test
- ▶ For each image and each sample of 50 shadow models, training of a logistic regression
- ▶ Vote of the logistic regression


> Interrogation results

- ▶ **Accuracy on the shadow model always in test: 66%**
- ▶ **Accuracy on the export model: 56%**

> Interrogation conclusion

- ▶ Current shadow models are bad witnesses
- ▶ **We must find better witnesses**
 - **Shadow models training without augmentation**
 - **Add variability in the training process of shadow model**
 - › **Optimizer, learning rate, epoch**
 - › **The more shadow models are different, the more some can be close to the target model**
 - › **More different model = more ability to the attack to generalize**
 - **Take times...**

For each instance, we consider 50 shadows models outputs randomly chosen



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New shadows models, new way of interrogation: the LIRA interrogation

> Interrogation process


- ▶ Black box attack base on Likelihood ratio
- ▶ Use the Hinge-Loss distribution
- ▶ Shadow models used to estimate for each instance:
 - The mean and standard deviation of a Gaussian distribution that fits the hinge-loss distribution according the fact the observation is seen in the training set
 - The mean and standard deviation of a Gaussian distribution that fits the hinge-loss distribution according the fact the observation is not seen in the training set
- ▶ If the hinge loss of the export model is more probable to be in the first gaussian distribution, we predict as train, else we predict as test

> Interrogation results

- ▶ Accuracy: 0.61
- ▶ Provide a confidence score with the prediction

> Interrogation conclusion

- ▶ Efficient process of interrogation, but need to be improved by a second approach of interrogation



Membership Inference Attacks from first principles, Carlini et al., 2022

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First white-box interrogation of the victim: the SIF interrogation

> Interrogation process


- ▶ White-box interrogation based on self-influence function
 - Estimate the influence of one instance on another instance knowing the model
 - if an instance was seen when the model was trained, then it will have a major influence on the model's output for data of the same class, which was not seen when the model was trained
- ▶ Training of a logistic regression to predict whether the instance was seen or not in the training set by using the following inputs:
 - Self-influence
 - Row and column average
 - Logit and hinge loss

> Interrogation results

- ▶ Accuracy: 0.64%

> Interrogation conclusion

- ▶ Efficient process of interrogation, but need to be improved by a second approach of interrogation



Influence matrix example for 40 instances of one given class

Membership Inference Attack using self-influence function, Cohen and Giryes, 2024

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

Final interrogation of the export model

> Interrogation process

- ▶ Combination of LIRA and SIF interrogation, with as inputs their predictions and confidence score
- ▶ Training of five classifiers
 - Logistic regression, Random Forest, Adaptive Boosting, Gradient Boosting, Naive Bayes
 - Majority vote
- ▶ To train classifiers, use of different shadows models compare to the ones used for training and test LIRA and SIF interrogations

> Interrogation results

- ▶ Accuracy: 0.65%




Results of the investigation

> 10 teams, 39 submissions

Team	Month	Acc.
Friendly Hackers	September	0.65
Friendly Hackers	September	0.64
Friendly Hackers	August	0.64
HackCuda MaData	August	0.62
HackCuda MaData	July	0.61
Friendly Hackers	August	0.61
HAL9000	September	0.59



Second Investigation

TASK B: FORGETTING ATTACK



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Open victim brain: latent space representation of data



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What are the shadow models that we search? And Why?

> Shadows models characterization

- › Shadows models with 40 classes and shadows models 70 classes
- › Each shadow model has her partition of training data
- › For each shadow model, we know all her genetic material

> Use of the shadow model

- › Comparaison of information extracted of the export and the shadows models
- › For one class
 - If the information are similars, we can assume that this class receive the same training process in the export and the shadow models
 - › For example, if one class has similar information on the shadows models with 40 classes and the victim, then this class can be not in the sovereign model


First interrogation: passive one

> Interrogation process

- ▶ Extraction of indicators on the latent space and comparison of these indicators on the victim and the shadows models
- ▶ Use of Isolation Forest and Silhouette Indice

> Interrogation results

- ▶ Accuracy: 0.7




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Second interrogation: active one

> Interrogation process

- ▶ Combination of the previous interrogation with an active one
- ▶ Intuition:
 - A class seen during the first phase of learning will be faster to retrain
 - A class seen during the first learning phase will be relearned differently from the control models learned on 40 classes
- ▶ Fine tuning
 - Transfer Learning
 - Consists in continuing to learn the model, in this case by adding the missing classes to the models (starting with models with 40 classes, we continue learning to learn a model with 70 classes)
- ▶ Comparaison of the rate of convergences of the different for all classes



> Interrogation results

- ▶ Accuracy: 1

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Results of investigation

> 3 Teams

Equipe	Mois	Acc.
Friendly Hackers	September	1
Friendly Hackers	June	0.70
Friendly Hackers	September	0.70
Friendly Hackers	July	0.65
Friendly Hackers	July	0.60
JCVD	July	0.60
Benaroya	August	0.60

Conclusion



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On-site investigation

> We need a lot of witnesses!


- Clones of the export model with different experiences




> In order to compare their response to that of the export model

- The closer their answers, the more similar their living environments, experiences and teachings will be to the amnesic person.

Shadows models generation



Combination of many interrogations process



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Close case ... that opens new perspective for Thales

- > A story paved with many tests & failures that led to success...
 - > Multi-skilled collaborative work
 - > A happy ending and first place in the standings for both tasks...
 - > ... And open new perspective at Thales
- New research topic: Machine Unlearning
 - One internship on Machine Unlearning
 - Two patents pending, presentations at CAID, CSAW, Confiance.AI and Séminaire CoaP

Leaderboard			
Tâche A : Membership Attack			
Friendly hackers	Soumission 6 (sept)		0.653125
Friendly hackers	Soumission 7 (sept)		0.642500
Friendly hackers			
HackCuda MaDat			
HackCuda MaDat			
Friendly hackers			

Leaderboard			
Tâche B : Forgetting Attack			
Friendly hackere	Soumission 8 (sept)		1.000000
Friendly hackers	Soumission 1 (juin)		0.700000
Friendly hackers	Soumission 7 (sept)		0.700000
Friendly hackers	Soumission 3 (juillet)		0.650000
Friendly hackers	Soumission 4 (juillet)		0.600000
Friendly hackers	Soumission 1 (juillet)		0.600000

Interested by the Machine Unlearning?
Please contact alice.heliou@thalesgroup.com and Vincent.thouvenot@thalesgroup.com



Countless models have been tortured in our experiments!

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Building a future we can all trust

Merci

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