



**SRA**  
System Research  
and Applications



life.augmented

# Random Number Generators in an Industrial Context

Patrick HADDAD – Ugo MUREDDU

Security Design Architect

System Research & Applications

STMicroelectronics

28/06/2023

# We are creators and makers of technology



One of the world's largest semiconductor companies



Over **50,000** employees  
of which **9,000+** in R&D



**\$16.1 billion** revenues  
in 2022



Over **80** sales & marketing  
offices serving over **200,000**  
customers across the globe




**14** main manufacturing  
sites



Signatory of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC)  
Member of the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA)

# Global presence



# SRA security summary



## System security, building blocks & SoC-level security

### System security

→ understand & anticipate system / applicative needs: IoT, AI, and smart mobility

Providing **security IPs** & expertise to product divisions throughout ST

**State-of-the-art lab** to perform side-channel and fault-injection attacks



General-purpose MCUs



Connectivity products



Imaging sensors



Wireless chargers



Automotive ICs

# Random Number Generation

# Random Generation – definition of terms

- RNG stands for Random Number Generators

- **TRNG**: True Random Number Generators

- Also called entropy source **ES**
    - Physical: e.g., Oscillators (noise exploitation)
    - Non-Physical: e.g., CPU jitter
    - **Unpredictability**



- **PRNG**: Pseudo Random Number Generators

- Also called **DRBG**: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
    - Algorithmic (e.g., AES based)
    - **Good statistical properties**

```
/* Initializes random number generator */
srand((unsigned) time(&t));

/* Print 5 random numbers from 0 to 49 */
for( i = 0 ; i < n ; i++ ) {
    printf("%d\n", rand() % 50);
}
```

- NIST standards



- SP800-90 B: **ES**
  - SP800-90 A: **DRBG**
  - SP800-90 C: **ES + DRBG**



- AIS standards



- AIS 31: **TRNG**
  - AIS 20: **PRNG**
  - AIS 20/31: **TRNG + PRNG**

# Unpredictability vs Good statistical properties

**Good statistical properties** do not necessarily mean **Unpredictability**  
**Unpredictability** does not necessarily mean **Good statistical properties**

**Good statistical properties** are demonstrated by **statistical tests** (bias, correlation, compression, etc.)  
**Unpredictability** are demonstrated by a **stochastic model** and quantified by **entropy amount**

**Entropy**: measure of disorder, expressed between 0 and 1 (being the best)

**Stochastic model**: provides a mathematical description of a noise source using random variables.  
Aimed at showing where the unpredictability (entropy) comes from

Challenge : A good RNG needs both!

↳ Why ?

# Impact of bias on cipher key generation

Assuming a good TRNG in term of randomness but with some bias

⇒ **ease** a **brute force cryptanalysis**

**16 possible keys of 4 bits**  
**(0% of bias)**

0000 1000  
0001 1001  
0010 1010  
0011 1011  
0100 1100  
0101 1101  
0110 1110  
0111 1111

**11 possible keys of 4 bits**  
**at least 2 bits at '1'**  
**(27.2% of bias)**

1001  
1010  
0011 1011  
1100  
0101 1101  
0110 1110  
0111 1111


**5 possible keys of 4 bits**  
**at least 3 bits at '1'**  
**(60% of bias)**

1011  
1101  
1110  
0111 1111



# Impact of bias on masking


Univariate CPA attacks against AES Sbox protected by 1st-order Boolean masking scheme



<https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications/article-2927.pdf>

# Commonly approved RNG structure


- Random physical source (e.g., Ring oscillator)
- Digitizer (e.g., Flip-flop)
- Post-processing (e.g., AES)
- Online tests



# A little bit of history

# Last millennium's publications: The pioneers

- Simple digitizers
- Analog flow, simple noise sources
- Security evaluation: black box statistical tests after postprocessing
  - To validate **Good statistical properties**
- Easy to implement
- Low throughput (order of Kbits/sec)



Digitizer proposed in [1] and [2]

- [1] Fairfield, R.C., Mortenson, R.L., Coulthart, K.B. (1985). An LSI Random Number Generator (RNG). In: Blakley, G.R., Chaum, D.
- [2] Jun, B., & Kocher, P. (1999). The Intel random number generator.

# The golden age: 1<sup>st</sup> decade of our millennium

- Proliferation of new principles
  - On the shelf noise sources:
    - Inverter based ring oscillators, PLLs, Latch's
  - Simple digitizers
    - Coherent sampling, Asynchronous counter...
- Security evaluation:
  - Black box tests before postprocessing
  - Rational on the noise's origin
- Easy to implement
- Good throughput (order of Mbits/sec)



# Age of Reason: 2<sup>nd</sup> decade of our millennium

- **Stochastic model** of some of principles of the previous decades

- |                             |                           |    |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----|
| • PLL based TRNG            | ~10 <sup>6</sup> bits/sec | ☹️ |
| • Elementary ROs based TRNG | ~10 <sup>3</sup> bits/sec | 😊  |
| • Open loop based TRNG      | ~10 <sup>6</sup> bits/sec | ☹️ |
| • Latch based TRNG          | ~10 <sup>6</sup> bits/sec | ☹️ |

- New principles with corresponding **stochastic models**

- |  |                           |    |
|--|---------------------------|----|
| • Asynchronous oscillators based TRNGs | ~10 <sup>8</sup> bits/sec | ☹️ |
| • Time to digital convertor based TRNG | ~10 <sup>6</sup> bits/sec | ☹️ |
- Security evaluation: model-based entropy estimation
  - Hard to implement




Cost  
Implementability

Hard to choose



# Do we really need a fully entropic noise source?

## Elementary ROs based TRNG



<b>(K,N)</b>	<b>(1,1)</b>	<b>(2,1)</b>	<b>(3,1)</b>	<b>(4,1)</b>	<b>(5,1)</b>
Entropy Per Output Sample	0.0975	0.1216	0.1397	0.1458	0.1515
<b>(K,N)</b>	<b>(1,1)</b>	<b>(1,2)</b>	<b>(1,3)</b>	<b>(1,4)</b>	<b>(1,5)</b>
Entropy Per Output Sample	0.0975	0.1913	0.2854	0.3849	0.4805


↳ Entropy is better improved by post-processing iterations than raw accumulation

# Recently certified RNG




# SP800-90B compliant TRNG


- As of June 8, 2023, 49 standalone entropy sources have been certified
  - 26 classified as “Physical noise source”
    - 18 Ring Oscillators (RO) based, 7 undisclosed and 1 LED + CMOS Sensor based
    - Claimed entropy before conditioning  $H_{\text{mean}} = 0.36$




Western Digital



AMD




IBM



Cisco

# AIS 20/31 – Functionality classes

New draft of AIS20/31 from BSI as of June 2023



- Standalone TRNG performing in all areas is **utopic**
  - Always a tradeoff between cost, throughput and good noise extraction
- Trend is to **ES/TRNG** + **DRBG/PRNG** => SP800 90C – AIS20/31
  - **ES/TRNG:**
    - As simple as possible
    - Good randomness extraction
    - Relatively low throughput
    - Statistical properties not ideal (before post-processing)
    - Not intended for 'direct' use – Seed for DRBG
  - **PRNG/DRBG:**
    - Based on cryptographic function
    - Good statistical properties
    - Fast
    - Pseudo-random

# RNG requirements

- *Recall* – Two main requirements on RNGs:
  - **Output unpredictability**: random source
  - **Good statistical properties** of the output bitstream: post-processing
- Additional requirements for industrial purposes: **robustness**
  - Stability and repeatability over process, voltage and temperature variations



Being able to guarantee a **sufficient level of entropy** before conditioning : stochastic model


**AND**

**Detect any loss below this level** : online tests


# Stochastic Model

# Stochastic model & jitter measurement

## Elementary ROs based TRNG



- $\sigma_{jitter}$  is the key parameter
  - Precise measurement of  $\sigma_{jitter}$  is a challenging task
  - A low constraints & accurate method is still a graal
    - A.Garay, F. Bernard, V. Fischer, P. Haddad, and U. Mureddu. An Evaluation Procedure for Comparing Clock Jitter Measurement Methods. CARDIS 2022



# Online tests

# Online tests – What standards say about it

## AIS31:

- *“An online test / health test shall :*
  - *Detect non-tolerable entropy defects sufficiently soon,*
  - *Be tailored to the stochastic model,*
  - *Use the raw random numbers, because they contain more information than the internal random numbers. “*

<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2023/use-of-stochastic-models-in-rbg-standards-challeng/images-media/session-3-mittman-use-of-stochastic-models.pdf>

## SP800-90B

- *“Intended to ensure that the entropy source continue to operate as expected.*
- *Goal is to obtain assurance that failures of the entropy source are caught quickly and with a high probability.“*

<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf>



# Online tests – What standards say about it

## SP800-90B: two approved online tests

- Repetition Count Test (RCT)
  - Designed to detect total failure (e.g., noise source stuck)
  - Counts identical values generated consecutively
  - If above a cutoff value => triggers an alarm
- Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)
  - Designed to detect large loss of entropy (e.g., strong bias)
  - Counts number of times the same value occurs within 1024 samples (for binary source)
  - If above a cutoff value => triggers an alarm

<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf>


# Online tests – What standards say about it

## SP800-90B: two approved online tests

- Need to consider false positive vs false negative rates
- False alarm: (false positive)
  - Entropy source operating correctly
  - Alarm raised
- Silent failure: (false negative)
  - Entropy source producing less entropy than claimed
  - No alarm raised
- How to determine cutoff values ?

# NIST strategy: under promise, over deliver

- $H_{[\text{real}]}$  = lowest expected entropy/bit of source
- $H_{[\text{good}]}$  = lowest acceptable entropy/bit of source
- Design source so  $H_{[\text{real}]} > H_{[\text{good}]}$
- Health tests detect error when entropy  $< H_{[\text{good}]}$




# Choosing test parameters

## Study from David (DJ) Johnston - Intel Corporation:

- 7800 samples of entropy data inputted to SP800-90B statistical test suite
- Entropy levels from 0.025 to 0.975 in 0.025 increments
- Actual entropy, Bias and  $H_{\text{original}}$ , along with estimation error and test with the lowest estimate recorded for each data point
- 200 runs per entropy level
- 39 entropy levels
- `ea_non_iid -i -v -t -l 0,1000000 1` was used

# Choosing test parameters

## Entropy systematically underestimated




=> SP800-90B min-entropy estimation is already H[good]

# Online tests alarm probability


Cut-off values determined with  $H_{\min} = 0.8$

- $C = 37$  for the RCT
- $C = 669$  for the APT



# Post-processing

Number of AES-CMAC post-processing compression rounds to get full entropy output




=> 3 rounds of post-processing

# Online tests & post-processing

Secure: Either we obtain full entropy output with post-processing or we trigger an alarm with 100% probability

Efficient: If we consider min-entropy of at least 0.8 in normal working conditions, probability of a false alarm is very low ( $\approx 0.00001\%$  probability)





# Conclusion

# Conclusion

- A good RNG needs **unpredictability** and **good statistical properties**
- Companies, academics and standards are merging to a consensus:
  - **Simple** and reliable **entropy source** with stochastic model to seed PRNG
  - Cryptographic **post-processing** to **accumulate** entropy
  - **Accurate online tests** to quickly detect failures
  - **Fast** algorithmic & cryptographic **PRNG**
- There still remains a lot of room for improvement

# Our technology starts with You



Find out more at [www.st.com/careers](http://www.st.com/careers)

© STMicroelectronics - All rights reserved.

ST logo is a trademark or a registered trademark of STMicroelectronics International NV or its affiliates in the EU and/or other countries.

For additional information about ST trademarks, please refer to [www.st.com/trademarks](http://www.st.com/trademarks).

All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners.



life.augmented